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I. INTRODUCTION
The law of mortgage foreclosures affects significant eco-
nomic interests of a large number of people, yet in most states
mortgage foreclosure procedures are carried out as a matter of
routine. The purpose of this Article is to critically explore the
current state of mortgage foreclosure law and to evaluate it in
terms of economic efficiency, equity, and fairness. The Article
ultimately concludes that strict foreclosure, rather than foreclo-
sure by sale, is the most efficient method of foreclosure, and is
equitable and fair in almost every situation.
On initial consideration, any theory premised upon the va-
lidity of strict foreclosure may appear defective because foreclo-
sure without sale is perceived as a penalty or a forfeiture and
hence inequitable and unfair. However, the thesis of this Article
is based on the assertion that the unfavorable reputation of
strict foreclosure is unwarranted. As one author has noted:
American students are familiar with the history of the
remedy of foreclosure which the English Chancellor developed
to relieve mortgagees after the development of the equity of
redemption. Americans commonly assume, however, that fore-
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MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
closure was a harsh and inequitable weapon which enabled
mortgagees to take advantage of luckless mortgagors. Their re-
action to the institution is indicated by the epithet which was
used in America to describe the institution of foreclosure with-
out a sale-namely, strict foreclosure. Under the English prac-
tice the contrast is between "foreclosure" and "foreclosure by
sale" as in America. The reason for the English usage is that
foreclosure was not in any sense "strict." The Chancellor had
been so zealous in his efforts to protect mortgagors and had
devised so many safeguards for mortgagors that the remedy of
foreclosure did not really foreclose. In England, therefore, the
demand for reform in foreclosures came from mortgagees, not
mortgagors; the changes which were made by the courts and
Parliament in the English law of foreclosure during the nine-
teenth century were designed to relieve mortgagees and not
mortgagors. 1
Modern mortgage foreclosure law is deeply rooted in per-
ceptions of the common law, particularly in the perception of
the forces behind strict foreclosure and the effects of strict fore-
closure. These perceptions have served as the focus for the de-
velopment of modern mortgage foreclosure law, including the
development of foreclosure by sale and many protections for
mortgagors. In seeking to protect mortgagors from mortgagees,
the law has been changed to implement poorly defined purposes
in furtherance of vague notions of equity and fairness.2 Further,
attempts at serious reform of mortgage foreclosure law have
failed to address what goals foreclosure law should have and how
to reach those goals; rather, reforms have been, on the whole,
piecemeal tinkering with accepted doctrines.'
Mortgage foreclosures are part of an economic transaction.
As such, mortgage foreclosures should and can be analyzed as
economic transactions. Efficiency should be the primary goal in
devising a mortgage foreclosure process because, in a broad
sense, efficiency benefits all parties to the mortgage foreclosure
1. Tefft, The Myth of Strict Foreclosure, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 575, 576 (1937)(footnotes
omitted).
2. For purposes of this Article, equity and fairness are distinct concepts. Equity is
society's method for allocating burdens and benefits. Fairness consists of both procedural
fairness in effecting the allocation of societal burdens and benefits, as well as the overall
fairness of that allocation.
3. For a discussion of the most prominent proposal for reform, the Uniform Land
Transactions Act, see infra notes 159-223 and accompanying text.
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process. Once one considers the inefficiency of past and current
mortgage foreclosure law and the inefficiency of the reform pro-
posals, one can accept efficiency as a positive goal for mortgage
foreclosure law. Almost all reforms which benefit mortgagors are
inefficient in that the reforms enhance mortgagors' bargaining
positions and their ability to delay the foreclosure process,
neither of which leads to the most efficient result. In addition,
large groups of people bear the costs of the current foreclosure
process, while very few benefit.
Prompt strict foreclosure offers the most efficient result.
Strict foreclosure is a rapid determination of a mortgagee's and
a mortgagor's economic rights: either the mortgaged property is
worth more than the mortgage loan balance and the parties will
deal accordingly, 4 or the property is worth less than the mort-
gage loan balance and the mortgagee will take the property to
satisfy the mortgage debt. Efficiency is not society's only goal,
but equity and fairness are served by strict foreclosure in almost
all cases.
II. THE STATE OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE LAW
A. History
Legal history is a controversial area of legal scholarship.
Scholars and practitioners alike question the use and accuracy of
legal history when examining some areas of law,5 and mortgage
foreclosure law is probably subject to that criticism. Criticism
notwithstanding, a review of the history of this area of the law is
important for a critical evaluation of its current status.6
4. The parties may agree to change their positions if it is in both parties' economic
interests, or a mortgagor will sell the property to a third party.
5. Much of the legal history written in the late 1800's is termed "apologetic." See
Horwitz, The Historical Contingency of the Role of History, 90 YALE L.J. 1057, 1058
(1981). Commentators have raised significant questions concerning the motivations for,
and conclusions reached in, previous historical scholarship. See generally Gordon, His-
toricism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981).
6. Without an evaluation of the accepted history of early mortgage law, it is too easy
to focus on foreclosure patterns that provide little justification for the law. In updating
Professor Osborne's treatise on mortgage law, Professor Nelson and Dean Whitman ex-
cluded pre-fourteenth century English history. Apparently, they used history to explain
current law rather than to evaluate it. See generally G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHIT-
MAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 1.2 (1979)[hereinafter cited as NELSON & WHITMAN].
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1. Form of the Transaction
Several terms have developed to describe the transaction in
which a lender obtains an interest in a borrower's property to
secure payment of a debt. Modern mortgage concepts originated
from the concept of a simple pledge.7 "Gage" is the Anglo-Saxon
term for pawn or "pledge" 8 and is etymologically linked to
"vadium," the Roman word for pledge.9 This etymological con-
nection suggests that a connection exists between the Roman
civil-law concept of pledge and the English concept of mortgage.
Although the connection between pre-Norman Conquest
Anglo-Saxon and Roman land security law cannot be identified
with certainty,1" one can ascertain that our present concept of
mortgage is similar to its counterpart in Roman law. Unlike An-
glo-Saxon law, Roman law contained no distinction between the
use of land or chattels as security for debts." Roman law pro-
vided a simple method for establishing a security interest.2 Ro-
man law did not require a lender to take possession of property
used for security; the lender obtained a lien by engaging in a
legally recognized notorious act, such as registration in a public
office.' 3 Upon default by the pledgor, Roman law, similar to
modern mortgage law, required the pledgee to bring a legal ac-
tion before realizing on the security.14
The term "mortgage" was probably first used before the
time of Glanville, who wrote around 1190.15 Glanville wrote of
both the vivum vadium, or live pledge, and the mortum vadium,
7. See generally 1 G. GLENN, MORTGAGES, DEEDS OF TRUST AND OTHER SECURITY
DEVICES AS TO LAND § 2 (1943); 1 L. JoNEs, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF
REAL PROPERTY §§ 2-4 (1915); G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 1
(2d ed. 1970); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 57-87 (2d ed.
1968)[hereinafter cited as POLLOCK]; Chaplin, The Story of Mortgage Law, 4 HARv. L.
REV. 1 (1890).
8. Chaplin, supra note 7, at 5.
9. Id.
10. 1 L. JONES, supra note 7, § la at 3; G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 1 at 2.
11. See Chaplin, supra note 7, at 5.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 7.
15. See generally 1 G. GLENN, supra note 7, § 2 at 3; 1 L. JONES, supra note 7, § 2 at
4; G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 1 at 2; 1 POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 119; Chaplin, supra
note 7, at 8.
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or dead pledge (hence "mortgage"). 16 Under a live pledge, the
pledgee (gagee) possessed the land and its profits, which the
gagee used to reduce the pledgor's (gagor's) debt.17 The situation
was similar under a dead pledge or mortgage, except that the
gagee received the land's profits to compensate him for loaning
money to the gagor, and the receipt of profits did not reduce the
amount of the original debt.' 8 The mortgage was deemed usuri-
ous because the mortgagee was compensated for his loan of
money.19 Usury was a sin, not a crime,20 and religious require-
ments apparently did not deter all lenders from using the
mortgage.2'
During Glanville's time, the only gage recognized in the
King's court required the gagor to put the gagee into actual pos-
session of the land.22 Interestingly, the gagee did not enjoy con-
tinued possession of the gaged land pursuant to any legally en-
forceable right.23 The gagor, or a third party, could force the
gagee from the property and the gagee's only legal remedy was a
suit for money damages.2 4 However, if the gagee did remain in
possession and the gagor failed to pay the debt when due, the
pledge became legal title and the gagee became the owner of the
gagor's estate.2 5 In order to defend his title, the gagee in
Glanville's time was required to prove his gagor's debt.26 The
gagee's status was later weakened when the developing common
law system of estates required that a gagee's interest be quantifi-
able as an estate for years, an estate for life, or an estate in fee.
27
Around 1260, the term of years became a popular form of
16. Id.
17. Id.
18, See generally 1 G. GLENN, supra note 7, § 2 at 4-5; 1 L. JONES, supra note 7, §§
2.3 at 4-6; G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 1 at 3; 1 POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 118-19;
Chaplin, supra note 7, at 8.
19. Late in the Twelfth Century, the receipt of any compensation for a loan of
money was usury. This is in contrast to the current definition of usury: the receipt of too
much compensation for a loan.
20. 1 POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 119.
21. G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 1 at 4.
22. Id. at 2; 1 G. GLENN, supra note 7, § 2 at 4.
23. 1 POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 120.
24. Id.
25. Chaplin, supra note 7, at 8.
26. Id. at 9.
27. 1 POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 122.
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gage, favored by gagees. 28 A gage could require a gagor to trans-
fer his estate to the gagee for a term of years and, if the gagor
failed to pay the debt, the gagee gained complete title to the
estate. 9 Under the term of years gage, the gagee's status was
that of tenant, and he was still required to prove the amount of
the debt if the gagor did not pay.30
Late in the thirteenth century,31 and certainly by the
fifteenth century,32 a transaction similar to the modern mortgage
emerged. 3 That transaction involved a mortgagor's execution of
a deed conveying the property in fee simple to the mortgagee, on
the condition that upon payment of the debt, title automatically
reverted to the mortgagor.3 4 On the due date, the mortgagor ei-
ther paid the debt and regained title, or failed to pay and for-
ever lost his claim to title. 5
The development of the rigid categorization of estates in
land therefore proved beneficial to mortgagees. As a result of
this development, before a mortgagee could obtain fee simple
ownership of the land, the mortgagor had to have initially trans-
ferred a fee simple estate.38 The mortgagee's position was fur-
ther strengthened by the development of the conditional deed. A
conditional deed of mortgage requires payment of a precise
amount at an exact time; a mortgagee's fee simple interest dates
from the execution of the mortgage and is only defeasible upon
payment that precisely meets the terms of the deed. The condi-
tional mortgage deed has fallen into disuse however, in sub-
stance if not in form, as a result of its harsh character:
While a mortgagee's interest in land has for a long period, in
this country, been a mere chattel estate, and has amounted in
substance to a mere pledge of the land, and is constantly char-
acterized as such, we still continue to create it by a deed pro-
fessing in terms to grant a conditional fee, and permit to cling
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 123.
32. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 1.2 at 5.
33. Id. See generally 1 G. GLENN, supra note 7, § 2 at 6; G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, §
5 at 8; Chaplin, supra note 7, at 8.
34. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 1.2 at 5.
35. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 7, § 2 at 8; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 1.2 at 6;
G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 5 at 9; Chaplin, supra note 7, at 8-10.
36. G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 5 at 8.
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to the contract, like a lichen growth, certain embarrassing fea-
tures of real estate title.
3 7
2. Lender's Realization on Security
The demise of the conditional mortgage deed is largely due
to the change in, and reliance upon, the procedures lenders use
to realize on their security. Professor Glenn once remarked that,
"So far as the mortgage is concerned, it is impossible to draw
the line between procedure and substantive law."38 Procedure
became critical because, in many situations, allowing the mort-
gagee to keep the mortgaged property would constitute a forefei-
ture, 39 and the common law chancellors were loath to allow
forfeitures.
40
In Glanville's time, if the gagor failed to pay the debt, the
gagee could use "a writ expressly framed for foreclosure.""' This
writ was similar not only to a suit for strict foreclosure,42 but
was also similar to the mandatory Roman law procedure for re-
alizing on a lender's vadium.4' The lender was still required to
prove his debt before he could obtain a judgment and legal title
to the security.
44
The lender's burden of proving the debt may explain the
shift to the use of conditional deeds.45 If the conditional deed
operated as written, it forced a mortgagor to bring suit to prove
that the mortgage deed's conditions had been met to regain
ownership of the security.46 In the law courts, therefore, if the
date for payment had passed and the condition could no longer
be fulfilled, the mortgagee became the owner of the security
without having to prove the debt.47 It is difficult to determine
37. Chaplin, supra note 7, at 4.
38. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 7, § 17.5 at 111.
39. A forfeiture occurs when the property is worth more than the amount of the
debt. The difference between value and debt is normally referred to as the owner's "eq-
uity." If the owner loses his "equity," in theory a forfeiture occurs.
40. Thus the maxim: "Equity abhors a forfeiture."
41. Chaplin, supra note 7, at 7.
42. Id. See infra notes 55, 72-101 and accompanying text.
43. Chaplin, supra note 7, at 7.
44. Id. at 9.
45. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
46. Chaplin, supra note 7, at 9.
47. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 1.2 at 6.
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whether the chancellors of the English courts ever permitted
strict adherence to the terms of mortgage deeds.48 Apparently,
however, the practice of allowing late-paying debtors to regain
the security dates back to Roman law.49 The chancellors of the
English court routinely permitted a mortgagor to make a late
payment. This practice became known as the "equity of
redemption." 50
By the early 1600's the equity of redemption was recognized
"as a matter of course and right."'51 A mortgagor had to tender
payment of the debt within a reasonable time in order to redeem
his estate.52 A mortgagee could deprive a mortgagor of his equity
of redemption by seeking a decree that required the mortgagor
to pay by a specific date or be precluded from later asserting a
claim to the security.5 s The mortgagee's ability to foreclose the
mortgagor's equity of redemption was a logical development be-
cause both parties needed to clarify their rights in the security.
54
Several methods developed for foreclosing a mortgagor's eq-
uity of redemption. Strict foreclosure is the ability to cut off the
equity of redemption and, under strict foreclosure principals,
the failure to redeem by the mortgagor leaves the mortgagee
with absolute ownership of the property. Another foreclosure
method is foreclosure by sale, which includes foreclosure by judi-
cially ordered sale and foreclosure by sale authorized by a power
of sale contained in the mortgage agreement. Foreclosure by sale
enabled mortgagors to avoid the harsh results of strict foreclo-
sure. Unlike strict foreclosure, under a foreclosure by sale the
mortgagee does not obtain the security in satisfaction of the
debt.5 5 Rather, the security is sold and the mortgagee receives
the proceeds of the sale up to the amount of the debt; the mort-
gagor receives the balance of the proceeds. 5s If the security is not
sold, the foreclosure becomes a strict foreclosure and the mort-
48. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 7, § 3 at 12-13; G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 6 at 13.
49. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 7, § 3 at 11; G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 3 at 6, 8; 1 L.
JONES, supra note 7, § 7 at 10.
50. See generally 1 G. GLENN, supra note 7, § 2 at 6-7.
51. G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 6 at 13.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 7, § 57 at 381.
55. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 7.31 at 519.
56. Id.
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gagee obtains ownership of the property.57
In summary, the history of mortgage law demonstrates an
effort to avoid forfeitures. Even well-written contracts were not
enforced if the enforcement caused one party to profit unfairly
from the loss of another. Although forfeitures have been histori-
cally disfavored, it was recognized that a court should allow the
mortgagee to act in its best interest where a mortgagor has no
worthwhile interest. Early courts resolved conflicts between
mortgagees and mortgagors on a case by case basis, guided only
by nebulous considerations of equity. Those courts' efforts have
influenced modern courts, and their concerns are undoubtedly
still present in modern courts' undefined sense of equity and
fairness.
B. Current Law
This section examines the modern treatment of the equity
of redemption, strict foreclosure, and foreclosure by sale. Addi-
tionally, it examines current provisions for reinstatement by a
mortgagor in default, appraisal of the security as part of foreclo-
sure, statutory redemption, and limitations on deficiency judg-
ments. Each of these concepts has an impact on the efficiency of
foreclosure and each indicates some notion of equity and
fairness.
1. Reinstatement
Reinstatement statutes allow a mortgagor to negate any at-
tempt by the mortgagee to accelerate the entire loan balance,
and thereby avoid foreclosure of the mortgage, by paying all pre-
sent and future installments due." A reinstatement statute es-
sentially gives a mortgagor an opportunity to require a mortga-
gee to behave as if a default never occurred. A "quasi-
reinstatement" statute has also emerged; if a mortgage agree-
ment does not contain an acceleration clause, quasi-reinstate-
ment statutes normally permit dismissal of judicial foreclosure
57. G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 311 at 648.
58. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 7.7 at 439. Professor Nelson and Dean
Whitman state that an increasing number of states are enacting reinstatement or arrear-
ages statutes. Id.
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proceedings upon the mortgagor's payment of past due pay-
ments, interest, and costs.59 Where a mortgage contains an accel-
eration clause, the mortgagor may only redeem by paying the
entire loan balance, interest, and costs.
6 0
Ten states have reinstatement statutes.6 ' Of the ten, two
states allow only foreclosure by sale62 and their reinstatement
statutes are specifically keyed to the judicial foreclosure pro-
cess." Five states limit reinstatement to situations in which the
mortgagee chooses to foreclose by a power of sale. 4 Two states
59. Eight states have quasi-reinstatement statutes. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.08 (West
1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-53-8 (Burns 1962); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 27A.3110
(West Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 581.07 (West 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2148
(1979); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1341 (McKinney 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-
12 (1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-47-10 (1979). Three of the eight states also have
true reinstatement. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.30 (West Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-
1012 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.090 (1984). The statutes in the eight quasi-
reinstatement states essentially restate the result a court would normally reach. If a
mortgagor pays all that is currently due before a judgment is granted in a foreclosure
action or before a court-ordered sale occurs, the mortgagor has cured his default and the
judicial proceedings are dismissed. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 7.4 at 430. One
critical difference found in many of these statutes applies when a mortgage does not
contain an acceleration clause. Unless a statute applies, many courts preclude a mortga-
gee, who has previously chosen to foreclose for failure to make payments before all pay-
ments are due, from bringing a future foreclosure action upon later defaults if the mort-
gage does not contain an acceleration clause. In such instances, courts find that the
initial foreclosure action extinguished the mortgage. Quasi-reinstatement statutes gener-
ally provide that, when a mortgagor redeems after judgment but future payments are
due on the mortgage, the judgment is satisfied only to the extent of the payments then in
default; upon later default, the mortgagee may conduct a foreclosure sale without bring-
ing a new action. The drafters of quasi-reinstatement statutes apparently intended to
benefit mortgagees with constantly defaulting mortgagors. Quasi-reinstatement statutes
are currently of little use because most mortgages now include acceleration clauses. Id. §
7.6 at 435. Quasi-reinstatement therefore has little impact on current mortgage foreclo-
sure law and its efficiency.
60. See generally supra statutes cited in note 59.
61. ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.070 (Supp. 1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-813 (1956);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924c (West Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95, § 57 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1983-84); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.30 (West Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-
59 (Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1012 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 404 (Purdon
Supp. 1983-84); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-31 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.090
(1974).
62. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 15-101 (Smith-Hurd 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §
3129 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
63. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95, § 57 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41,
§ 404 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
64. ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.070 (Supp. 1982); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-813 (1956);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.30 (West Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1012 (1979); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24090 (1984).
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allow reinstatement in both judicial and power of sale foreclo-
sures.," One state allows reinstatement in both judicial and
power of sale foreclosures of deeds of trust.66
True reinstatement statutes affect the foreclosure process
because a defaulting mortgagor is able to save himself from ac-
celeration. Interestingly, most of the states with reinstatement
statutes permit reinstatement in either judicial or power of sale
foreclosures, but not both. All the reinstatement statutes pro-
vide, however, that in addition to curing a default, a mortgagor
must pay his mortgagee's basic costs in proceeding to foreclo-
sure.6 7 With the exception of Nebraska's statute, all of the rein-
statement statutes provide for the mortgagee's recovery of attor-
ney's fees.68 Additionally, all reinstatement statutes except those
of Alaska, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania allow a mortgagee to re-
cover trustee's fees."9 Alaska, Illinois, and Pennsylvania restrict
the number of times a mortgagor may use reinstatement.70
Although provisions requiring a mortgagor to pay a mortga-
gee's costs may deter a mortgagor from abusing the privilege of
reinstatement,7' reinstatement statutes may result in ineffi-
ciency. The existence of true reinstatement statutes lengthens
the foreclosure process and makes it more expensive in the ten
states that have them. Three of the ten states, California, Illi-
nois and Pennsylvania, are among the country's most populous;
this inefficiency is therefore not insubstantial.
2. Strict Foreclosure
Strict foreclosure is a procedure by which a mortgagee gains
judicial termination of a mortgagor's equity of redemption,72 and
becomes the owner of the mortgaged land in satisfaction of a
debt.73 No sale of the property is required.7 4 Today, strict fore-
65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924c (West Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-59 (Supp.
1983).
66. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-31 (Supp. 1983).
67. See supra statutes cited in note 61.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 7.8 at 441.
72. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
73. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 7.9 at 443.
74. Id.
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closure is rarely used in this country.7 5
Six states expressly provide for strict foreclosure as a pri-
mary method of foreclosure-Connecticut, Maine, Massachu-
setts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Illinois.s Of these states,
the most limited version of strict foreclosure is found in Illinois.
An Illinois appellate court, in Great Lakes Mortgage Corp. v.
Collymore,77 construed statutory provisions requiring foreclosure
by sale in most instances to nonetheless permit common law
strict foreclosure.7 8 At common law, the court found strict fore-
closure is available to a mortgagee under limited circum-
stances.79 Additionally, Collymore stated that strict foreclosure
was permissible only upon proof of certain facts:
(1) that the mortgagor or the owner of the equity of redemp-
tion is insolvent; (2) that the value of the property is less than
the mortgage indebtedness and taxes on the property; and (3)
that the mortgagee accepts title to the property in extinction of
the mortgage indebtedness, i.e., that he gives up the right to a
deficiency judgment against the mortgagor."0
The court in Collymore noted that each of the above facts was
75. The predominant form of foreclosure in the United States today is foreclosure
by sale-either by judicially ordered sale or pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or
a deed of trust. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 7.9 at 442.
76. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-17 (West. 1978); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6201
(1980 & Supp. 1983-84); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 244, § 1 (West 1959); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 479:26 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4528 (1973); Great Lakes Mortgage
Corp. v. Collymore, 14 Ill. App. 3d 68, 302 N.E.2d 248 (1973). Other states provide for
strict foreclosure in special circumstances. Four states-Minnesota, Nebraska, New
Jersey and Oregon-clearly provide for strict foreclosure when it is equitable. See MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 581.12 (West 1947); Morgan v. Zoucha, 203 Neb. 119, 277 N.W.2d 564
(1979); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Camp, 124 N.J. Eq. 403, 1 A.2d 425 (1938); Herrmann v.
Churchill, 235 Or. 327, 385 P.2d 190 (1963). New Jersey also bars redemption when a
mortgagee is in continuous possession of the mortgaged property for 20 years after de-
fault by the mortgagor. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:50-21 (West 1952). Professor Osborne listed
twelve more states that provide some support for strict foreclosure in special circum-
stances: Alabama, California, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New
York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Dakota and Utah. G. OSBORNE, supra note 7,
§ 312 at 651. Finally, forfeiture of installment land contracts is a type of strict foreclo-
sure, but its availability in any state is questionable. See generally NELSON & WHITMAN,
supra note 6, §§ 3.25-3.32 at 79-110; Durham, Forfeiture of Residential Land Contracts
in Ohio: The Need for Further Reform of a Reform Statute, 16 AKRON L. REV. 397
(1983).
77. 14 Ill. App. 3d 68, 302 N.E.2d 248 (1973).
78. Id. at 71, 302 N.E.2d at 250.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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proved in that case.8' The appellate court subsequently ordered
the trial court to enter a decree for strict foreclosure that in-
cluded a three-month redemption period.82
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and
Vermont have statutes that specifically permit a mortgagee to
use strict foreclosure as a primary remedy.8 3 After strict foreclo-
sure is decreed or asserted, these five states give a mortgagor a
specific time period in which to redeem. 4 If the mortgagor does
not redeem within that period, his right of redemption termi-
nates. 5 The redemption period is three years in Massachusetts
6
and one year in Maine s7 and New Hampshire."' The redemption
period is six months in Vermont, although the court may
shorten the redemption period in its discretion." In Connecti-
cut, a court must set a redemption period when it decrees
foreclosure.9 0
Where a mortgagee can choose between different methods
of foreclosure including strict foreclosure, the length of the re-
demption period affects a mortgagee's decision to choose strict
foreclosure. A mortgagee in Massachusetts is likely to opt for
foreclosure by sale because Massachusetts law cuts off the abil-
ity of the mortgagor to redeem at the time of sale,9l while in a
strict foreclosure, a mortgagor may redeem for three years after
the foreclosure decree.2 By contrast, strict foreclosure is more
attractive to a mortgagee in Vermont, who must wait just six
months or less to determine whether the mortgagor will re-
deem. 3 This period of time is typically shorter than the sale
process itself.
An analysis of strict foreclosure in Connecticut, Maine,
81. Id. at 72, 302 N.E.2d at 251.
82. Id. at 73, 302 N.E.2d at 251.
83. See supra statutes cited in note 76.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN ch. 244, §§ 1, 18 (West 1959).
87. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 6202, 6204 (1980).
88. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 479.19 (1983).
89. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4528 (Supp. 1983).
90. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bassford, 120 Conn. 348, 180 A. 692 (1935).
91. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 244, § 11 (West 1959). A power of sale must be in the
mortgage. Id.
92. Id. §§ 1, 18.
93. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4531a (Supp. 1983). In order for a Vermont mortgagee
to choose foreclosure by sale, the mortgage must contain a power of sale. Id.
[Vol. 36
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Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Illinois is not
complete without a discussion of the availability of deficiency
judgments. Under strict foreclosure, a mortgagee obtains owner-
ship of the security rather than a money judgment followed by a
sale to raise the money awarded. Illinois courts refuse to permit
deficiency judgments after strict foreclosure. 4 The Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, and Vermont statutes do not state whether a mortga-
gee may obtain a deficiency judgment following strict foreclosure
but these states' statutes specifically provide for deficiency judg-
ments following foreclosures by sale.95 The New Hampshire stat-
ute does not address deficiency actions.96 The Connecticut stat-
ute allows deficiency actions following the strict foreclosure
redemption period.
97
Some commentators9" assert that foreclosure without sale in
the United States deserves the label "strict" because it operates
"summarily, harshly and oppressively."9' 9 Strict foreclosure is
often criticized as harsh when the mortgaged property's value
has greatly increased. 100 On the other hand, it is reasonable to
provide the swift remedy of strict foreclosure to the mortgagee if
the mortgaged property's value is equal to or less than the
amount of the mortgage debt.110 Further, strict foreclosure may
be efficient in all cases because the parties to a mortgage can
easily ascertain their rights at any given time. On the other
hand, modification of strict foreclosure may confuse the parties'
legal rights and may lessen the efficiency of strict foreclosure.
3. Foreclosure by Sale
a. Judicial Foreclosure
The American answer to strict foreclosure criticism was
94. 14 Ill. App. 3d at 71, 302 N.E.2d at 250.
95. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 6203-D, 6324 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
244, § 17A (West 1959); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4532(d)(Supp. 1984).
96. See supra note 88.
97. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-14 (West Supp. 1983-84).
98. G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 312 at 652; Tefft, supra note 1, at 595.
99. Teift, supra note 1, at 595.
100. Id. at 588.
101. If the mortgaged property is worth the same or less than the amount of the
debt, the mortgagor has no economic interest to protect. Attention then shifts to other
values promoted by a foreclosure process.
19851
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foreclosure by sale, and more usually, foreclosure sale by court
order. Virtually every state provides for judicial foreclosure, the
process that allows the mortgagee to bring an action for a court-
ordered sale of the mortgaged property after a default by the
mortgagor.102
Judicial foreclosure is the primary method of foreclosure in
at least twenty-five states. 03 Thirty-four states permit foreclo-
sure by power of sale provisions10 4 and six states allow strict
foreclosure as a primary method of foreclosure.10 5 Any prefer-
ence for judicial foreclosure in states with alternative methods of
foreclosure may frequently be explained by reference to the dif-
ferent requirements of the available foreclosure options. For ex-
ample, Massachusetts has a three-year redemption period fol-
lowing strict foreclosure, 08 but it does not have a post-sale
redemption period following a court-ordered sale.10 7 Further, if
lien priority problems or junior lienholders are present, a mort-
gagee may be wise to address title problems in a judicial foreclo-
102. ALA. CODE § 35-10-3 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.170 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33-721 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-1106 (1979); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726
(West Supp. 1984); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-38-106 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-61
(West. 1978); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5601 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.01 (West
1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-187 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 667-1 (1976); IDAHO CODE
§ 6-101 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 15-101 (Smith-Hurd 1984); IND. CODE ANN. §
32-8-16.1 (Burns Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 654.1 (West 1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-2401 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 426.005 (1972); LA. CODE CIv. PROc. ANN. art. 2331
(West 1960); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6322 (Supp. 1983-84); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 11-502 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 244, § 11 (West 1959); MIcH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3101 (West Supp. 1984-85); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 581.02 (West
1947); MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-5-93 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 443.190 (Vernon Supp. 1984);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2138 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §
40:430 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 479:22 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 50-36 (West
1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-4-13 (1978); N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW § 1351 (McKinney
Supp. 1983-84); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-339.3 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06
(1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.07 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 686
(West 1960); OR. REV. STAT. § 88.010 (1983); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 3129 (Purdon
Supp. 1983-84); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-27-1 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-650 (1976); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-47-13 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-5-101 (Supp. 1984); TEx.
PRop. CODE ANN. § 53.154 (Vernon 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-37-1 (1977); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 4531A (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 8.01-96 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
61.12.060 (1961); W. VA. CODE § 38-4-14 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 846.01 (West 1977);
Wyo. STAT. § 1-18-111 (Supp. 1984).
103. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 7.11 at 446.
104. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
106. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 244, §§ 1, 18 (West 1959).
107. Id. § 11.
476 [Vol. 36
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sure action rather than opt for a power of sale foreclosure and
leave title questions unanswered.'08
The problem with judicial foreclosure is that it is typically a
lengthy procedure and is therefore expensive:
A typical action in equity to foreclose and sell involves a
long series of steps: a preliminary title search to determine all
parties in interest; filing of the foreclosure bill of complaint
and lis pendens notice; service of process; a hearing, usually by
a master in chancery who then reports to the court; the decree
or judgment; notice of sale; actual sale and issuance of certifi-
cate of sale; report of the sale; proceedings for determination of
the right to any surplus; possible redemptions from foreclosure
sale; and the entry of a decree for a deficiency.10 9
Procedures for judicial foreclosure vary widely but in every state
the process is difficult and expensive.
b. Power of Sale Foreclosure
The concept of the power of sale is to provide a streamlined
process similar to, but better than, judicial foreclosure.110
Thirty-four states have statutes that provide for power of sale
foreclosure,"' the process that allows the mortgagee to force a
108. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 7.12 at 447. Some states expressly require
all foreclosures to be by judicial action. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.01 (West 1969);
IDAHO CODE § 6-101 (1979). Others accomplish the same result by prohibiting private
sales pursuant to a power of sale. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 15-101 (Smith-
Hurd 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-7-7 (1978). Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Ver-
mont, on the other hand, restrict use of judicial foreclosure to situations in which there is
a power of sale in the mortage. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 244, § 11 (West 1959); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 479:22 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4531A (Supp. 1984). Neverthe-
less, the question of the availability of judicial foreclosure is clearly resolved in favor of
allowing it, while it takes some affirmative authority to allow other forms of foreclosure.
Professor Osborne argued that power of sale should be available unless otherwise pro-
vided. G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 337 at 726. The states do not appear to have heeded
this argument because most states that do not have power of sale statutes have no case
law discussing nonjudicial foreclosure. Professor Nelson and Dean Whitman assert, in
their update of Professor Osborne's work, that in states not having power of sale stat-
utes, title questions following a nonjudicially ordered sale usually deter attempts at using
a power of sale. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 7.12 at 447.
109. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 7.12 at 447.
110. Tefft, supra note 1, at 590.
111. ALA. CODE § 35-10-3 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.070 (Supp. 1983); ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 33-807 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-1112 (1947); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §
725a (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113 (Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-
17
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sale of the mortgaged property without bringing a judicial ac-
tion. Provisions for power of sale foreclosure vary widely from
state to state.
112
Georgia, Maryland, and North Carolina have unusual varia-
tions in their power of sale foreclosure process. In these three
states, court confirmation of the sale is required in some, or all,
power of sale foreclosures before the sale is final. In Maryland,
all foreclosure sales conducted pursuant to powers of sale con-
tained in mortgages or deeds of trust must receive "final ratifica-
tion by the court."'11 3 A mortgagee in Georgia who exercises a
power of sale may only seek a deficiency judgment by petition-
ing a court for confirmation of the sale within thirty days of the
sale." 4
North Carolina law provides that a mortgagee must cause a
hearing to be held before the clerk of court prior to exercising a
14-160 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 667-5 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 45-1503 (1977); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6203-A (1980); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 7-105 (1981); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 244, § 14 (West 1959); MICH. Copm. LAWS ANN. § 600.3201 (1983);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.01 (West. Supp. 1983); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-5-117 (1972); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 443.290 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-223 (1983); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-1005 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 107-080 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
479:25 (1983); N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. Law § 1401 (McKinney 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
45-21.1 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-22-01 (Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 86.710 (1983);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-22 (1970); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-48-1 (1979); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 35-501 (Supp. 1983); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 3810 (Vernon Supp. 1982-83);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-23 (1974); VA. CODE § 55-59 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
61.24.030 (Supp. 1983-84); W. VA. CODE § 38-1-3 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 846.51 (West
1977); Wyo. STAT. § 34-4-102 (1977).
112. Nine of the thirty-four states allow power of sale only if the security instru-
ment is a deed of trust rather than a mortgage. See Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-807
(1956); IDAHO CODE § 45-1503 (1977); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-223 (1983); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 107-080 (1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 86.710 (1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-23
(1974); VA. CODE § 55-59 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.030 (Supp. 1983-84); W.
VA. CODE § 38-1-3 (1966). In Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Vir-
ginia, the power of sale is conferred even if it is not in the deed of trust. Two states that
permit private foreclosure sales of mortgages also confer the power of sale by statute. See
ALA. CODE § 35-10-3 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-22-01 (1980). Further, two states up-
hold powers of sale in special situations. Montana confers the power of sale only when
the parcel subject to a deed of trust is 15 acres or less. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-
304(1)(1983). North Dakota confers the power of sale only when the mortgagee is the
Bank of North Dakota or the mortgagor is the Board of University and School Lands
and the mortgagee is the State of North Dakota. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-22-01 (1980).
In the remaining states allowing a power of sale, the power of sale must be stated in the
mortgage or deed of trust.
113. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 7-105 (Supp. 1983).
114. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-161 (1982).
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power of sale.115 If the clerk of court finds that there is a valid
debt, a default, that the mortgage contains a power of sale, and
that proper notice has been given to the mortgagor, the clerk
must authorize the sale." 6 The clerk's finding may be appealed
to the state's district or superior courts. 117 Finally, if a mortga-
gee buys at the sale, a mortgagor may attack the fairness of the
sale price in defending the mortgagee's suit for a deficiency."'
The statutes of these three states do not, in all cases, fur-
ther the purpose underlying power of sale foreclosure. Power of
sale foreclosure is designed to accomplish foreclosure more rap-
idly than other methods by eliminating judicial action." 9 Be-
cause these statutes require incurring the time and expense of a
judicial action,120 the purpose of the power of sale is not served.
The power of sale foreclosure process is simple, but may be
time consuming. Furthermore, titles acquired by purchasers at
power of sale foreclosures may be subject to title defects. Every
state requires notice of an impending sale,12 as well as a waiting
period between the notice and the sale. 22 Professor Nelson and
Dean Whitman list three reasons why a purchaser's title may be
less stable in a power of sale foreclosure than in a judicial
foreclosure:
First, the court supervision involved in judicial foreclosure will
prevent many defects from arising. Second, because judicial
foreclosure is an adversary proceeding, the presence of other
parties who will bring possible defects to the court's attention
constitutes added protection against a faulty end product. Fi-
nally, the concept of judicial finality provides substantial insu-
lation against subsequent collateral attack even on technically
defective judicial foreclosure proceedings. None of these pro-
tections are inherent in power of sale foreclosure.
123
In some cases, therefore, power of sale foreclosure provides
an easier, quicker method of foreclosure than does judicial fore-
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16(a)(1969).
116. Id. § 45-21.16(d).
117. Id.
118. Id. § 45-21.36.
119. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 7.20 at 477.
120. See, e.g., MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 7-105 (Supp. 1983).
121. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 7.19 at 475.
122. Id.
123. Id. § 7.20 at 477.
1985] 479
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closure. This is true in those situations where only one mortgage
exists and no other liens, claims, or questions about title or pri-
ority arise. If, however, there are questions about liens or other
claims, or the power of sale is open to judicial attack for im-
proper notice or improper disposition of proceeds, power of sale
foreclosure may be undesirable. Because even a simple power of
sale foreclosure involving one mortgage and no other liens or
claims may involve a mortgagor's attack on the notice of the
sale, all such sales are subject to some uncertainty. Even if the
mortgagee successfully defends the private sale, the lengthy ju-
dicial process defeats the purpose of the power of sale.
Further, problems with unstable titles may reduce the num-
ber of interested buyers at a foreclosure sale held pursuant to a
power of sale and those who buy will probably pay less because
of the risk of judicial action. Potential title problems and the
resulting depressed sales of mortgaged property reduce the effi-
ciency of power of sale foreclosure and make its purported supe-
riority to judicial foreclosure questionable.
c. Establishing Value and Court Confirmation
Nine states permit the value of mortgaged property to be
established at judicial foreclosure sales'24 while only Arkansas
permits the value of mortgaged property to be established at
power of sale foreclosure sales.125 In general, these states' stat-
utes are designed to encourage high bids at the time of the fore-
closure sale and to force resale if the highest bid price is too low.
These nine states' statutes vary widely.
If a mortgaged property in Arkansas does not bring at least
two-thirds of its appraised value at a foreclosure sale, the sale is
disregarded and a second sale is held within one year.126 Further,
if a second sale is held, the high bid at the sale will be accepted
but the mortgagor will have one additional year to redeem his
property for the sale price plus interest of ten percent per an-
124. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2415 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 426.520 (1972); LA. CODE
Civ. Poc. ANN. art. 2332 (West 1984-85); MicH. CohiP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3155 (West
1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-5-93 (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-5-7 (1978); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2329.17 (Page 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.12.060 (1961); W. VA.
CODE § 38-4-22 (1966).
125. AnK. STAT. ANN. § 51-1112 (1947).
126. Id.
480 [Vol. 36
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num.127 In theory, the mortgagee is encouraged to bid at least
two-thirds of the appraised value, but if the mortgagee does not
or cannot so bid, the foreclosure process is delayed for two years.
In four of the nine states where value is established in judi-
cial sales, the value so established serves as a guide to the court
in confirming the foreclosure sale.1 28 In each of these four states,
the court may accept or reject a bid, regardless of whether the
bid is higher or lower than the established value. Two of these
states, Kansas and Washington, also allow the court to order
that a value be established before the sale to provide a bidding
level that must be reached before the sale will be confirmed.
129
In Michigan,130 the court sets an "upset" price, a level that the
bidding must reach before a sale may occur. The New Mexico
l31
and Ohio 32 statutes provide that no sale is valid unless the high-
est bid is at least two-thirds of the appraisal of the mortgaged
property. A different variation is found in the West Virginia
statute, which provides that when the cash sales price is less
than two-thirds of the established value, the property must be
offered on credit terms; the higher of the cash or credit bids
must be accepted.133 Finally, the Louisiana Code provides that
when a sale yields less than two-thirds of the property's estab-
lished value, the sheriff must resell the property to the highest
bidder at the new sale. 34 The statutes in these nine states pro-
vide varying degrees of efficiency to the foreclosure process.
With the exception of Louisiana and West Virginia, more than
two sales may be necessary before a court's prescribed minimum
price is bid. The cost of foreclosure by sale is increased by any
such delay.
127. Id. For a discussion of statutory redemption and its impact on the foreclosure
process, see infra notes 147-58, 222-23 and accompanying text.
128. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-25 (West Supp. 1983-84); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
2415 (1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-5-93 (1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.12-060
(1961).
129. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2415 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.12.060 (1961).
130. MICH. CoMp. LAws § 600.3155 (West 1968).
131. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-5-7 (1978).
132. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.17 (Baldwin 1975).
133. W. VA. CODE § 38-4-22 (1966).
134. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 5253 (West 1983).
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4. Deficiency Judgments
A mortgagee's ability to recover a deficiency judgment
against the mortgagor when a foreclosure produces a sum that is
less than the mortgage debt affects both the initial mortgagee-
mortgagor relationship and the efficiency of foreclosure by sale.
Theoretically, allowing a mortgagee to pursue a mortgagor for a
personal judgment may induce the mortgagee to rely on a mort-
gagor's personal wealth and therefore accept more risk with re-
spect to the security. On the other hand, not allowing a defi-
ciency judgment may cause a mortgagee to insist on a greater
amount of security for a loan.
The availability of a deficiency judgment may also affect the
mortgagee's participation at the foreclosure sale. Allowing a
mortgagee to reach a mortgagor's other assets does not en-
courage the mortgagee to bid up to the property's value at a
sale. On the other hand, not permitting a mortgagee to obtain a
deficiency judgment induces him to bid up to the amount of the
mortgage debt in order to minimize his loss by reselling the
property on the open market.
Twenty-nine states statutorily permit deficiency judgments
after judicial foreclosure sales.135 Thirteen of these twenty-nine
states limit deficiency judgments in some way.1"' Some states
limit recoveries for deficiencies to certain types of mortgagors or
property.137 Other states limit the amount of deficiency judg-
135. ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.180 (1973); ARI. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-727 (1974); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 51-1110 (1947); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 49-28 (West Supp. 1983-84); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.06 (West 1984); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 6.108 (West 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 15-112 (Smith-Hurd 1984);
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-8-11-2 (Burns 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 654.6 (West 1950); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6203-E (1980); MICH. CohiP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3150 (West 1968);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 581.09 (West 1947); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-5-111 (1972); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 443.240 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-232 (1983); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 40.459 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-50-2 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. REAL PROP.
ACTS. LAW § 1371 (McKinney 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2329.08 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 686 (West 1960); OR. REV. STAT. §
88.770 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-660 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-47-16
(Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-37-2 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4532 (Supp.
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.12.070 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 846.04 (West 1977).
136. Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New York,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, and South Dakota limit deficiency
judgments. See supra statutes cited in note 135.
137. Arizona does not permit the recovery of a deficiency judgment if the property
in question is improved with a one or two family dwelling; California refuses recovery if
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ments to no more than the difference between the appraised or
established value and the mortgage debt. 138 This limit theoreti-
cally encourages mortgagees to push the resale bidding to at
least the lesser of the mortgage debt or the fair market value.
Only one state, Nebraska, prohibits deficiency judgments follow-
ing judicial foreclosures. 39 The remaining twenty states have no
express statutory or common law provision for deficiency actions
following judicial foreclosure.
Of the thirty-four states that allow power of sale foreclo-
sure,140 twelve states specifically allow deficiency judgments fol-
lowing a power of sale foreclosure,14 1 and three states specifically
prohibit them.1 42 One state, Montana, allows deficiency judg-
ments following power of sale foreclosures unless the mortgagee
is the original vendor of the mortgaged property1 43 or the mort-
gaged property consists of fifteen acres or less.144 Eight of the
twelve states that allow deficiency judgments after power of sale
foreclosures limit recovery to no more than the difference be-
tween the mortgage debt and the value of the mortgaged prop-
erty.145 However, in the remaining eighteen states that permit
the mortgaged property is an owner-occupied one to four unit dwelling; Florida will not
allow recovery when the mortgage is a purchase money mortgage and the mortgagee buys
the property at the sale; Montana will not allow recovery if the vendor is the mortgagee;
and Oregon refuses a recovery if the mortgage is a purchase money mortgage or a trust
deed that is judicially foreclosed against an owner-occupier. See supra statutes cited in
note 135.
138. Idaho, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and
South Dakota provide such a limit. See supra statutes cited in note 135. Connecticut
adds to this limit one-half of the difference between established value and the sale bid.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-28 (West Supp. 1983-84).
139. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-2139 to -2140 (1979).
140. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
141. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-814 (1956); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-161 (1982);
IDAHO CODE § 45-1512 (1977); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6603-D (1980); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 244, § 17A (West 1959); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3280 (West 1968 &
Supp. 1984-85); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.23 (West Supp. 1983); NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1012
(1981); NEv. REv. STAT. § 40-455 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.36 (1979); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 21-48-14 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-32 (1974).
142. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(d) (West 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 86.770 (1981);
WASH. RE V. CODE ANN. § 61.24.100 (1974).
143. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-235 (1983).
144. Id. § 71-1-317.
145. Arizona, Idaho, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, South Dakota,
and Utah limit the deficiency judgment to no more than the difference between the
mortgage debt and the value of the mortgaged property. See supra statutes cited in note
141. Arizona also bars any deficiency action if the property is two and one-half acres or
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power of sale, a mortgagee should be able to bring an action for
the difference between the sale price and the secured debt.14
On the whole, few states place real restrictions on deficiency
judgments. State statutes that limit the amount of deficiency
judgments are designed to encourage bidding at foreclosure sales
but have little practical impact on mortgagees and mortgagors.
The few states that prohibit or severely limit the availability of
deficiency judgments increase the cost of mortgage foreclosure.
5. Post-Sale Redemption
Post-sale (or statutory) redemption has a dramatic effect on
the efficiency of the foreclosure process. Post-sale redemption al-
lows a mortgagor, and in some cases a junior lien holder, to re-
deem the mortgaged property after a foreclosure sale has been
held.147 A mortgagor's equity of redemption before sale has a
different impact on the sale process than does the right to re-
deem after the sale. Faced with the threat of statutory redemp-
tion, a buyer will pay less for the mortgaged property at a fore-
closure sale because he must gamble that at the end of the
redemption period he will get the property rather than a return
of his money if the mortgagor redeems.
Twenty-nine states have statutory redemption. Twenty-five
of those states have statutory redemption following judicial fore-
closure sales, 14s and fourteen have statutory redemption follow-
ing power of sale foreclosure. 149 Maine alone has a one-year re-
less and improved by a one to two family dwelling. Id. Michigan only so limits the defi-
ciency if the mortgagee is the buyer at the foreclosure sale. Id.
146. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 7.1 at 425.
147. Id. § 8.1 at 525.
148. ALA. CODE § 6-5-230 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.250 (1973); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-1282 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-1111 (1947); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 729.030
(West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-102 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 11-402 (Supp.
1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-122 (Smith-Hurd 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 628.3
(West 1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2414 (Supp. 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. § 426.530 (1972);
MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 600.3130(2) (West 1968 & Supp. 1984); MINN. Comp. LAWS ANN. §
581.10 (West 1968 & Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-802 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 21.210 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:50-4 (West Supp. 1983-84); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-
5-18 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.4 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-24-02 (Supp. 1983);
OR. REV. STAT. § 23-560 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-52-11 (1979); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 66-8-101 (1982); UTAH R. Civ. P. 69(F)(1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.24.140
(Supp. 1983-84); Wyo. STAT. § 1-18-103 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
149. ALA. CODE § 6-5-230 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-1112 (1971); COLO. REV.
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demption period following notice of strict foreclosure."'
Interestingly, of the fourteen states that allow statutory redemp-
tion following power of sale foreclosure, all but Missouri, Rhode
Island, and Wisconsin also allow it in judicial foreclosure. 15'
However, eight states that have power of sale foreclosure do not
allow statutory redemption following power of sale foreclosure
sales although they permit statutory redemption following judi-
cial sales.
52
Redemption periods vary widely. The statutory redemption
periods following judicial foreclosure sales range from ten days
in North Carolina15 3 to two years in Tennessee. 5 4 Fifteen states
have redemption periods of one year following judicial foreclo-
sure sales. 5 5 The range for statutory redemption periods follow-
ing power of sale foreclosure sales is ten days in North Caro-
lina 56 to three years in Rhode Island. 57 Eight states provide for
a one year redemption period following power of sale
foreclosure.1
5 8
Permitting statutory redemption decreases the amounts bid
at sale because a buyer buys subject to the mortgagor's right to
redeem; he may therefore never get possession of that which he
is bidding to buy. Statutory redemption is therefore costly and
STAT. § 38-39-102 (1973); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3130 (West 1968 & Supp. 1984);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.23 (West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 443.410 (Vernon 1952);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-228 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.4 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 35-22-20 (1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-23-3 (1970); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-52-1
(1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-8-101 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 846.61 (West 1977); Wyo.
STAT. § 1-18-103 (Supp. 1983).
150. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6202 (1980).
151. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 443.10 (Vernon 1952); R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-23-3 (1970); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 846.61 (West 1977).
152. Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington do
not allow statutory redemption following power of sale foreclosure. See supra statutes
cited in note 148.
153. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-339.25 (1969).
154. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-8-101 (1982).
155. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minne-
sota, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, and Washington have ba-
sic one year redemption periods following judicial foreclosure sales. See supra statutes
cited in note 148.
156. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-339.37 (1969).
157. R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-23-3 (1970).
158. Alabama, Arkansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota,
and Wisconsin provide a one year redemption period. See supra statutes cited in notes
148-49.
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affects the efficiency of mortgage foreclosure.
C. Uniform Land Transactions Act
The Uniform Land Transactions Act (ULTA) was promul-
gated in 1975 by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws,' and was extensively amended in 1977.160
The ULTA deals with all contractual transfers of real prop-
erty.16 1 The ULTA was intended to "have a major impact on the
development of legislation in the real property law area....
The Commissioners stated that one of the major purposes of the
ULTA was to provide uniformity in state laws, thereby facilitat-
ing an atmosphere that would encourage greater development of
the secondary mortgage market.1
6 3
1. Protected Parties
The ULTA specifically singles out "protected parties" for
special protection in mortgage foreclosures.164 Section 1-203 of
the ULTA provides that a protected party is one of three types
of persons who is involved with "residential real estate.' 16 5 Resi-
dential real estate is a parcel of not more than three acres im-
proved or to be improved with four or fewer dwelling units for
which the protected party has not been a lessor for commercial
purposes."6 The types of persons who may be protected parties
in a secured transaction under the ULTA are: (1) a person who
occupies or intends to occupy the premises as his residence;
(2) a person who is primarily or secondarily liable on the loan
159. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 129, 151 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CoMIssIoNERS' HANDBOOK 1975].
160. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS' ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 172 (1977) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSIONERS' HANDBOOK 1977].
161. COMMISSIONERS' HANDBOOK 1975, supra note 159, at 129.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 152.
164. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 1-203(a), 13 U.L.A. 560 (West Master ed.
1980).
165. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 1-203(b), 13 U.L.A. 314 (West Master ed.
Supp. 1984). A parcel qualifies as residential real estate even if the protected party puts
part of the parcel to a commercial use. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 1-203 comment
3, 13 U.L.A. 562 (West Master ed. 1980).
166. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 1-203(b), 13 U.L.A. 314 (West Master ed.
Supp. 1984).
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and is related to an individual who occupies or intends to occupy
the premises as his residence; and (3) a person who purchases
residential real estate and assumes or takes subject to the obli-
gation of a prior protected party.167 The third provision allows a
person to purchase real estate from a protected party, assume
the protected party's loan, rent the premises for residential use,
and still be a protected party.
2. Reinstatement
Section 3-512 provides mortgagors with limited rights to re-
instate the mortgage and avoid acceleration. Under this section,
protected parties are given much more latitude than other mort-
gagors. Notwithstanding any acceleration, a protected party may
reinstate the mortgage prior to the sale of the mortgaged prop-
erty""8 by paying all sums due, performing all other obligations
due under the mortgage note, and-paying the mortgagee's costs
of proceeding to foreclosure reasonably incurred after the mort-
gagee gave notice of his intent to foreclose. 6 9 This section also
provides significant protection to a mortgagee by allowing a pro-
tected party mortgagor to avoid acceleration only once every
twelve months.70
It is much more difficult for nonprotected party mortgagors
to avoid acceleration under the ULTA. After a mortgagor's de-
fault, a mortgagee must give at least fifteen days notice of accel-
eration and the mortgagor must make all past due payments
within the fifteen day period in order to avoid acceleration. 71
This provision is a statutory fifteen day grace period in addition
to any grace period provided for by the mortgage note.172
Section 3-512 also contains a codification of the common
167. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 1-203(a), 13 U.L.A. 560-61 (West Master ed.
1980).
168. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTONS ACT § 3-508, 13 U.L.A. 702 (West Master ed. 1980).
Under § 3-508, a mortgagee who has a power of sale may exercise the power at a public
sale or by a privately negotiated sale. Id. Reinstatement by a protected party is allowed
until either a public sale is held or a contract is executed in a privately negotiated sale.
Id. § 3-512(a), (c), 13 U.L.A. at 709-10.
169. UNir. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3-512(c), 13 U.L.A. 710 (West Master ed.
1980).
170. Id. § 3-512(d), 13 U.L.A. at 710.
171. Id. § 3-512(b), 13 U.L.A. at 710.
172. Id.
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law equity of redemption. It provides that a mortgagor may
avoid foreclosure by tendering, prior to a sale, all sums due
under the mortgage along with reasonable costs of proceeding to
foreclosure.
173
3. Strict Foreclosure
In its current form, the ULTA does not address strict fore-
closure in great detail. A specific procedure for judicial foreclo-
sure is set forth in section 3-509.174 Section 3-509 is intended to
be the sole means of judicial foreclosure under the ULTA. How-
ever, section 3-509(h) states that "[a]ny existing procedure for
strict foreclosure is not affected by this section,' 7 5 which leaves
standing any existing statutory or common law right to strict
foreclosure. The current version of the ULTA makes no other
mention of strict foreclosure.
The original version of section 3-507 included a detailed
treatment of strict foreclosure. 76 However, the strict foreclosure
provisions of that section were deleted by the 1977 Amendments
to the ULTA. 17 7 Former section 3-507 was entitled: "Taking Ti-
tle in Satisfaction of the Obligation.' 7 s Not surprisingly, the
first provision of former section 3-507 precluded strict foreclo-
sure upon a mortgagor who was a protected party. '7 To qualify
for strict foreclosure under the previous version of the ULTA,
the mortgagee's mortgage had to contain a provision authorizing
strict foreclosure. 80 After the mortgagor's default, former sec-
tion 3-507(a) required the mortgagee to give notice to the mort-
gagor and to any other person with a recorded interest that
173. Id. § 3-512(a), 13 U.L.A. at 709.
174. See infra notes 193-217 and accompanying text.
175. UNIp. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3-509(h), 13 U.L.A. 322 (West Master ed.
Supp. 1984).
176. COMMISSIONERs' HANDBOOK 1975, supra note 159, at 279-82.
177. COMIMISSIONERS' HANDBOOK 1977, supra note 160, at 175-76. Section 3-507 is
now entitled "Index of Notice and Time Provisions to Foreclosure." UNIF. LAND TRANS-
ACTIONS ACT § 3-507, 13 U.L.A. 322 (West Master ed. Supp. 1984).
178. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3-507, 13 U.L.A. 322 (West Master ed. Supp.
1984). See also COMMISSIONERs' HANDBOOK 1975, supra note 159, at 279-281 (the provi-
sions of the former § 3-507 are contained therein).
179. See COMMISSIONERs' HANDBOOK 1975, supra note 159, at 279-81.
180. See id. at 276.
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could be terminated by strict foreclosure. 81 Former section 3-
507 required the notice to state that, in the event no one enti-
tled to receive notice objected within five weeks, the mortgagee
could take title to the mortgaged property.8 2 Further, former
section 3-507 required that the notice be recorded and sent to
each person entitled to receive it, unless the only person entitled
to receive notice was the mortgagor.
18 3
If any party entitled to receive notice of strict foreclosure
objected within five weeks, former section 3-507 required that
the mortgagee abandon strict foreclosure and resort to foreclo-
sure by sale.18 4 If no one entitled to notice objected, the mortga-
gee could execute a deed to himself, which would effectively
transfer clear title to him, and he could then take possession of
the mortgaged property subject to title becoming absolute.8 5
Until title became absolute, any objection that the mortgagee
was not entitled to strict foreclosure or did not comply with the
statute was remediable by redemption or a demand for foreclo-
sure by sale. Title became absolute upon the earlier of the mort-
gagee's execution of a contract to sell the mortgaged property or
two years.'8 6 Use of former section 3-507 precluded a mortgagee
from bringing a deficiency action. 87
One commentator, Professor Bruce, characterized former
section 3-507 as "an expedient and inexpensive device that pro-
vides a needed alternative in commercial secured transac-
tions."' 8 Bruce stated that he hoped "the traditionally negative
view of strict foreclosure" would not limit the use of former sec-
tion 3-507.189 Despite the foregoing commentary, former section
3-507 lasted only two years. It is difficult to explain why former
section 3-507 was deleted when the ULTA was amended. Most
of the amendments apparently arose from discussions between
the ULTA's drafters and American Bar Association groups and
181. See id. at 279-80 (citing former § 3-507(a) of the Uniform Land Transactions
Act).
182. Id.
183. Id. (citing former § 3-507(c) of the Uniform Land Transactions Act).
184. Id. (citing former § 3-507(d) of the Uniform Land Transactions Act).
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing former § 3-507(f) of the Uniform Land Transactions Act).
187. Id. (citing former § 3-507(e) of the Uniform Land Transactions Act).
188. Bruce, Mortgage Law Reform Under the Uniform Land Transactions Act, 64
GEo. L.J. 1245, 1282 (1976).
189. Id.
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representatives."9 ' Former section 3-507 was the prime casualty
of the amendatory process; the drafters made few other substan-
tive changes to Article Three of the ULTA between the 1975
and 1977 versions.191 It is still interesting to note the effect of
former section 3-507. The required notice had to state that fore-
closure by sale could be forced by the mortgagor but ,that he
could thereafter be liable for any deficiency. 92 Theoretically,
this provision would cause a mortgagor with little or no equity
not to impede the foreclosure and to simply allow the mortgagee
to take the property. The drafters of former section 3-507
designed it to give a mortgagor a choice in determining whether
to submit to strict foreclosure. The mortgagor needed only to
object to strict foreclosure to prompt foreclosure by sale. The
mortgagor could thus short circuit an otherwise speedy foreclo-
sure process.
4. Foreclosure by Sale
a. Judicial Foreclosure
Under the ULTA, judicial foreclosure is less favored than
power of sale foreclosure.1 93 The traditional judicial foreclosure
process is, however, "radically" altered by the ULTA to "mini-
mize its inherent limitations.' ' 94 Interestingly, the judicial fore-
closure section provides that after a judgment of foreclosure, the
foreclosure sale is conducted under the ULTA power of sale pro-
visions unless the judgment specifies otherwise. 195
ULTA's foreclosure by sale process is simple. The mortga-
gee must give notice of acceleration and intent to foreclose'9 6
and may file suit immediately thereafter unless the mortgagor is
a protected party.19 7 If the mortgagor is a protected party, the
mortgagee must wait five weeks after default before giving no-
190. COMMISSIONERS' HANDBOOK 1977, supra note 160, at 151.
191. Id.
192. COMMISSIONERS' HANDBOOK 1975, supra note 159, at 280 (citing former § 3-
507(a) of the Uniform Land Transactions Act).
193. Bruce, supra note 188, at 1284.
194. Id. at 1285.
195. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS AcT § 3-509(c), 13 U.L.A. 705-06 (West Master ed.
1980).
196. Id. § 3-505(b), 13 U.L.A. at 697.
197. Id.
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tice of intent to foreclose. 198 The mortgagor must then wait an
additional five weeks before filing suit.'9 9 All appropriate parties
must be served in the foreclosure action. 00 In the event a court
finds the mortgagor in default and proper notice has been given,
the court must enter judgment for the mortgagee and order a
sale.
20 1
In most cases the sale is then carried out under section 3-
508, the power of sale section.20 2 After the sale, the person who
conducted it must report to the court and the court must con-
firm the sale if "justice has been done."203 The court clerk must
then enter satisfaction of the judgment to the extent of the pro-
ceeds of the sale, and, except to the extent that deficiency judg-
ments are limited by section 3-510(b),20 4 any deficiency becomes
a general judgment lien as of the date the judgment is entered
by the clerk.20 5
Although this statutory foreclosure process is speedy, two
matters are left to the common law. First, the court can direct a
sale to be "conducted in accordance with the law relating to the
sale of real estate on execution. '206 Second, no statutory guid-
ance is given for determining whether "justice has been done by
the sale. '207 Professor Bruce suggests that courts will have to
look to prior law to decide when they will confirm sales.20 8 There
is no indication whether a court may consider the property's
value in confirming a sale, or what standards it will use if it does
consider the property's value. A court may opt for a non-ULTA
sale or it may refuse to confirm a sale and cause delay by hold-
ing another sale. The use of either creates a potential for delay
beyond the time inherent in the ULTA's streamlined foreclosure
provision.
198. Id. § 3-505(d), 13 U.L.A. at 698.
199. Id. § 3-505(b), 13 U.L.A. at 697.
200. Id. § 3-509(c), 13 U.L.A. at 705-06.
201. Id.
202. Id. See infra notes 209-23 and accompanying text.
203. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3-509(e), 13 U.L.A. 706 (West Master ed.
1980).
204. See infra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
205. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3-509(e), 13 U.L.A. 706 (West Master ed.
1980).
206. Id. § 3-509(c), 13 U.L.A. at 706.
207. Id. § 3-509(e), 13 U.L.A. at 706.
208. Bruce, supra note 188, at 1285.
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b. Power of Sale Foreclosure
Section 3-508 of the ULTA permits power of sale foreclo-
sure only if the process is authorized by the mortgage or some
other agreement between the mortgagee and the mortgagor.
29
As with a judicial foreclosure, a mortgagee must wait five weeks
after default before notifying a protected party of his intent to
foreclose. Public and private sales are forbidden for a five week
period after a mortgagee notifies a mortgagor of his intent to
exercise his power of sale. 210 A mortgagee must also notify all
persons with recorded interests that may be extinguished by
such a sale.2 1 The notice must state the time and place of any
public sale, and, if a private sale is intended, the mortgagee's
intent to execute a private sale contract and the time after
which a private sale may be made.212
Section 3-508 differs from most power of sale statutes by
authorizing private sales. Section 3-508(a) requires that for any
sale, public or private, "every aspect of the sale, including
method, advertising, time, place, and terms, must be reasona-
ble. ' ' 213 In addition to authorizing private sales, section 3-508
permits sales in parcels or on credit.21- 4 A mortgagee may buy the
mortgaged property at a public sale and may even buy it at a
private sale if the private sale is conducted by a "fiduciary or
other person not related to the creditor." 215
c. Establishing Value and Court Confirmation
The ULTA contains no provision for establishing the value
of mortgaged property sold under its provisions.21 6 Furthermore,
the only confirmation required by the ULTA is that following a
court-ordered sale. In that circumstance, the ULTA directs a
court to confirm that "justice has been done by the sale.
'217
209. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3-505(c), 13 U.L.A. 697 (West Master ed.
1980).
210. Id. § 3-508(a), 13 U.L.A. at 702-03.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
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5. Deficiency Judgments
The ULTA generally permits deficiency judgments21 and
the ULTA specifically provides for obtaining such a judgment in
the judicial foreclosure procedure.219 The ULTA's only restric-
tion is that no deficiency judgment may be obtained against a
protected party after foreclosure of a purchase money security
interest.220 The Act does not limit the amount of a deficiency
judgment a mortgagee may obtain against either a protected or a
nonprotected party. The common law rule that the amount of a
deficiency equals the debt less the sale proceeds apparently
prevails. 22
6. Post-Sale Redemption
The ULTA does not permit post-sale redemption. Professor
Bruce calls the omission a "wise" step.222 He views the granting
of an absolute equity of redemption until sale, along with a pro-
tected party's ability to reinstate, as "fair balance" to the exclu-
sion of post-sale redemption. 23
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the current status of mortgage foreclo-
sure law according to economic efficiency, equity, and fairness.
The preceding sections have set forth the current status of mort-
gage foreclosure law with an emphasis on those aspects which
create difficulty in proceeding with the mortgage foreclosure and
therefore increase the costs of foreclosure. Mortgage foreclosure
is part of a broader economic transaction which begins with the
mortgage loan itself and ends with the loan's satisfaction by
payment or foreclosure. Nevertheless, it is possible to consider
the process of mortgage foreclosure independently in order to
evaluate its efficiency. Foreclosure has demonstrable costs which
218. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3-510(b), 13 U.L.A. 707-08 (West Master ed.
1980).
219. Id. § 3-509(e), 13 U.L.A. at 708.
220. Id. § 3-510(b), 13 U.L.A. at 707-08.
221. Bruce, supra note 188, at 1287.
222. Id. at 1277.
223. Id.
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affect persons directly and indirectly involved with the lending
and borrowing of money. Equity and fairness are factors in
mortgage foreclosure law, and, although their place has been dif-
ficult to determine, equity and fairness are implicit in current
mortgage foreclosure procedures.
A. Efficiency
1. Basic Considerations
"Efficiency" has both plain224 and complex225 meanings. The
definition adopted by Professor Polinsky is perhaps the best for
purposes of this Article: "the relationship between the aggregate
benefits of a situation and the aggregate costs of the situa-
tion. '226 Efficiency is reaching the best result from the stand-
point of costs and benefits, disregarding notions of equity or
fairness.
An examination of mortgage foreclosure procedural effi-
ciency must include a consideration of the entire lending pro-
cess. This Article is therefore based upon certain assumptions
about the relationship between foreclosure and the entire lend-
ing process. Perhaps the most important assumption is that
commercial mortgagees 227 do not vary the interest rates charged
to mortgage borrowers according to the creditworthiness, or po-
tential for default, of the borrower. Instead, commercial mortga-
gees establish and charge one rate to those meeting their mini-
mum creditworthiness criteria regardless of the borrower's
particular financial stability.228 The cost of an increased risk un-
224. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 362 (1977) defines "efficiency" as "ef-
fective operation as measured by a comparison of production with cost."
225. Judge Posner defines efficiency as "exploiting economic resources in such a way
that 'value'-human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay
for goods and services-is maximized." R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (2d
ed. 1977).
226. M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONoMicS 7 (1983).
227. Commercial mortgagees are entities, usually banks, thrift institutions, and in-
surance companies, engaged in mortgage lending as a primary part of their business.
This Article primarily applies to commercial mortgagees because it is difficult to catego-
rize the lending policies of private mortgagees such as homeowners and business persons
engaged in selling their own property. Private mortgagees behave differently because
they frequently have motivations for lending other than the receipt of interest.
228. The loan approval process is usually a "yes" or "no" proposition rather than an
evaluation of what a particular mortgagor should have to pay to make a loan to him
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dertaken by a commercial mortgagee will not directly affect the
interest rate charged to the particular mortgagor presenting the
greater risk. Instead, a lender spreads that risk by increasing the
interest rates charged to all persons entering into mortgage
transactions with that commercial mortgagee.
A second assumption is that a commercial mortgagee passes
on the cost of foreclosing on defaulted mortgages to its mortgage
borrowers in the form of higher interest rates, to its savings de-
positors in the form of lower interest rates, or to its stockholders
in the form of lower earnings. This assumption is in turn based
upon the assumptions that foreclosing a mortgage costs money
and a mortgagee must offset higher mortgage foreclosure costs in
some manner.
This Article further assumes that competition exists among
commercial mortgagees.229 The less expensive and more predict-
able the foreclosure process is, the more freely competitive com-
mercial mortgagees will be. Consider, for example, a market con-
sisting of ten commercial mortgagees, each holding a different
percentage of the mortgage market. As is typical in most busi-
ness settings, some mortgagees hold large market shares, while
others' market shares are quite small. Mortgagees will distribute
the anticipated risk of loss on each loan resulting from a lengthy
foreclosure over all mortgage loans. Assuming that economies of
scale apply to the lending industry, the smaller a commercial
mortgagee's loan pool is, the larger the incremental cost per loan
will be. A small commercial mortgagee's loan pool may be so
small that spreading the anticipated risk over its loan pool in-
hibits its ability to compete with larger commercial mortgagees.
Although all commercial mortgagees should benefit from
simple, predictable foreclosure procedures, small commercial
mortgagees will receive the greatest benefit. Small commercial
mortgagees could compete more effectively with large commer-
cial mortgagees because lower foreclosure costs would reduce the
interest rates they must charge. 30 In any event, lower costs for
profitable.
229. For example, on December 23, 1984, published interest rates for mortgages in
Dayton, Ohio varied from 8/2 % to 14%. Dayton Daily News, Dec. 23, 1984, at F2, col. 1.
230. If efficiency is viewed in the aggregate, it is irrelevant where the benefits or
reduced costs fall. The benefits involved in loss allocation are relevant, however, when
considering equity and the political impact of changing foreclosure law.
1985] 495
35
Durham: In Defense of Strict Foreclosure: A Legal and Economic Analysis o
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
all mortgagees would improve the lending environment for all
commercial mortgagees by reducing loan interest rates, raising
interest paid to depositors, increasing mortgagees' earnings, or
some combination of the three.
Finally, at the risk of taking assumptions too far,231 two fur-
ther assumptions lead one to conclude that any savings in fore-
closure costs will result in lower interest rates on mortgage
loans. The first assumption is that commercial mortgagees are
sufficiently profitable that any reduction in their cost of doing
business will not result in increasing their profits but rather in
lowering the cost of their product, the rate of interest charged
on mortgage loans. The second assumption is that the interest
rates paid by commercial mortgagees to their savings depositors
either have been regulated and are therefore limited or are in-
flexible because of competition. 232 If one accepts these two pro-
positions, the obvious result from lowering the cost of mortgage
foreclosures for commercial mortgagees will be a reduction in
the interest rates charged to their mortgage borrowers.
In summary, an individual defaulting mortgagor does not
bear the cost of mortgage foreclosure. The costs are borne by a
larger group or groups that may include depositors, sharehold-
ers, or mortgagors in general. Also, lower foreclosure costs bene-
fit society in general. Lowering foreclosure costs reduces the cost
of the mortgage process, increases competition between commer-
cial mortgagees, and thereby lowers mortgage loan interest rates.
The interests of a mortgagor, a mortgagee, a mortgagee's
savings depositors, and a mortgagee's shareholders may conflict
with respect to the speed of the foreclosure process. For a mort-
gagee, a speedy foreclosure at low cost and high economic return
is almost always best. For a particular mortgagor, however,
231. A colleague, Harry Gerla, referred to the following as "assume a can opener."
His reference was to the story recounted by Professor Polinsky, involving a shipwrecked
economist, physicist, and chemist. The only food available was a can of beans but the
three had no way of opening it. The physicist and the chemist suggested complicated
scientific methods for opening the can. The economist chided them for the complexity of
their solutions and said, "[M]y approach is much simpler: assume a can opener." M.
POLINSKY, supra note 226, at 1. These assumptions are offered as possibilities because
they focus the results of the analysis on changes in foreclosure law.
232. This situation may change with the deregulation of the banking industry. Ef-
fective January 1, 1985, interest rate limits have been lifted on Savings Deposits over
$1,000, see 12 C.F.R. § 217.7(b)(1984)(as amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 56,938 (Dec. 27,
1983)), and Money Market Deposit Accounts over $1,000, see 12 C.F.R. § 217.7(g)(1984).
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speed may not be to his individual economic advantage. The
longer the foreclosure process, the more time a mortgagor has to
reinstate or redeem the mortgage or to dispose of the property
in the market if the market value of the property exceeds the
debt.
If a mortgagor acts in his best economic interest, a mortga-
gor will reinstate, redeem, or sell only when he believes that the
property can be disposed of for a price in the open market
higher than the debt and that the gain from the sale will out-
weigh the cost of a foreclosure delay.233 The economic interests
of a mortgagee and a mortgagor coincide when a foreclosure sale
obtains the highest price. Otherwise, their interests are opposed
with respect to the speed of the foreclosure process and the abil-
ity of the mortgagor to delay foreclosure. It should be
remembered, however, that continued timely payment by the
mortgagor is the most efficient result for all participants in the
commercial mortgage lending process.
2. Coase Theorem
In what has come to be known as the "Coase Theorem, ' '234
Ronald Coase 235 proposed an approach for evaluating the effi-
ciency of the assignment of legal rights. To use the Coase Theo-
rem in its most basic form, one must assume that, in negotiating,
two parties incur no transaction costs; 236 that is, one is con-
cerned with the substantive costs and benefits rather than the
costs of getting together and negotiating.23 A basic statement of
the Coase Theorem is as follows: If there are no transaction
costs, the efficient outcome will occur no matter to which party
legal rights are assigned.238
One may utilize the Coase Theorem to analyze mortgage
foreclosure law efficiency. If the law gives mortgagees a legal
right to absolute, immediate, nonjudicial strict foreclosure upon
233. Predictions of a mortgagor's behavior are based on the assumption that a mort-
gagor is an economic actor and acts to maximize his wealth or minimize his losses, and
does not act emotionally.
234. See M. POLINSKY, supra note 226, at 11-14.
235. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
236. M. POLINSKY, supra note 226, at 12.
237. See infra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
238. M. POLINSKY, supra note 226, at 12.
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default by mortgagors, a mortgagor will repurchase a property
from a mortgagee by paying the mortgage loan balance when the
purchase is in the mortgagor's best economic interest. A mortga-
gee will retain a property when it is not in a mortgagor's best
economic interest to purchase the property.2 9 On the other
hand, if the law permits mortgagors to insist upon a long, pro-
tracted foreclosure process, a mortgagee will simply purchase
that right from a mortgagor when it is in the mortgagee's best
economic interest. When it is not in a mortgagee's best economic
interest to purchase a mortgagor's right to delay the foreclosure
process, the parties will undertake the process. 40 In reality,
however, as Coase himself points out, transaction costs are in-
herent in negotiation. 41
B. Transaction Costs
Parties cannot conduct transactions without incurring some
costs. Efficiency in an economic transaction depends not only on
maximizing the aggregate economic benefits available to the par-
ties, but also on minimizing the costs of determining the size of
a party's share of those benefits. Transaction costs therefore
play a significant role in determining what is efficient; the trans-
action costs may be so high that such costs render inefficient a
result determined to be efficient in the abstract. "In general,
transaction costs include the costs of identifying the parties with
whom one has to bargain, the costs of getting together with
them, the costs of the bargaining process itself, and the costs of
enforcing any bargain reached. ' 242 This broad definition does
not quite fit the mortgage foreclosure process, unless the statu-
torily mandated process is viewed as a search for the party with
whom the mortgagee must bargain, either a purchaser at a sale
or the mortgagor himself. If the mortgage foreclosure process is
interpreted in this way, the transaction costs are relatively easy
to identify.
The mbrtgage foreclosure process has significant transaction
239. It will be in a mortgagor's economic interest to repurchase the property when
the property has a market value greater than the balance on the mortgage loan.
240. Coase, supra note 235, at 15.
241. Id.
242. M. POLINSKY, supra note 226, at 12.
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costs, most of which are incurred directly by the mortgagee. The
mortgagee's transaction costs may be categorized as costs in-
curred in taking direct actions and costs incurred by the passage
of time prior to conclusion of the foreclosure process. Direct
costs include fees paid by a mortgagee to persons handling the
technical aspects of a foreclosure, the cost of filing notices, the
cost of filing a lawsuit, trial related costs, and the cost of a fore-
closure sale.
The cost of time passage is the time value of money, or in-
terest. Interest may or may not be reimbursed in the foreclosure
process. During the foreclosure process, the interest payable
under a note continues to accumulate at the contract rate until a
judgment is entered or a sale is completed. A mortgagee may
suffer loss to the extent that prevailing market interest rates ex-
ceed the contract rate because, after acceleration is declared, the
mortgagee is entitled to invest his money as he chooses but can-
not because foreclosure has not yet been completed.
Quantifying a mortgagor's transaction costs is not accom-
plished as easily. One such cost is the value of the mortgagor's
time spent negotiating about a threatened foreclosure or defend-
ing a foreclosure action. A mortgagor also incurs out-of-pocket
expenditures, such as attorney's fees during the defense of a
foreclosure action. Additionally, in some cases, a mortgagor may
bear the cost of foreclosure indirectly by paying a higher price
for a loan at its inception. In most cases, a mortgagor is also
assessed certain costs directly at the completion of the foreclo-
sure process.24 3
One type of transaction cost is difficult to assign to either
party. Properties sold at a foreclosure sale typically sell for less
than market value.244 When a property is worth less than the
mortgage loan balance, the "loss" corresponding to the differ-
ence between the property's market value and the sales price
falls on the mortgagee. This loss is shared by a mortgagee and a
mortgagor when the value of mortgaged property exceeds the
243. If the value of the mortgaged property is less than or equal to the amount of
the mortgage debt, these foreclosure costs will be borne by the mortgagor only if the
jurisdiction allows a deficiency judgment.
244. The most likely buyer at a foreclosure sale is the mortgagee, who will pay no
more than the balance on the mortgage loan. See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra
note 6, § 7.12 at 452.
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mortgage loan balance but does not exceed the sum of the mort-
gage loan balance and the costs associated with the foreclosure
sale. Finally, this loss falls on the mortgagor when the foreclo-
sure sale price exceeds the sum of the mortgage loan balance
and the costs of the foreclosure process.
Transaction costs may be substantial, regardless of the
party bearing the burden of payment. The assignment of the
parties' legal rights in a mortgage foreclosure affects the amount
of aggregate transaction costs. For example, assigning to a mort-
gagee the absolute right to immediate strict foreclosure without
judicial action reduces transaction costs to a minimal amount. In
that instance, the only cost attributed to the transaction is the
cost of bargaining between a mortgagee and a mortgagor, which
is only incurred when a mortgagor feels he has an economic in-
terest in the property worth protecting. On the other hand, as-
signing to the mortgagor the rights most beneficial to him, as for
example, allowing a broad right to reinstate before sale and to
redeem after sale, makes transaction costs relatively high. In
such an instance, a mortgagee must choose one of two alterna-
tives: he must either endure the lengthy process and incur the
cost or he must negotiate with the mortgagor. Presumably, a
mortgagor would be fully aware of his redemption and reinstate-
ment rights and that he is free of the costs allocated to the
mortgagee. Assigning legal rights in a mortgage foreclosure is
therefore important because the assignment affects transaction
costs.
C. Equity and Fairness
Although considerations of economic efficiency may indicate
that a mortgagee should have an absolute right to immediate,
nonjudicial strict foreclosure, the public and most legislators
likely would reject that result. The justification for a foreclosure
procedure other than nonjudicial strict foreclosure deemphasizes
economic efficiency in favor of equity and fairness.
Efficiency as a policy objective relates only to insuring the best
possible use of factors or outputs of production. Not only are
other policy objectives important, but they often take prece-
dence over efficiency considerations. The most important of
these other objectives are insuring fairness in economic distri-
bution ("equity") and fairness in the process of exchange
[Vol. 36
40
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol36/iss3/6
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
("procedural fairness").245
This section identifies the most important factors contributing
to equity and fairness in mortgage foreclosures and considers
each factor in relation to the others.
1. Equity
Equity may be either the subjective expression of societal
preference for the assignment of legal rights or the objective de-
termination of what societal preferences should be, based on an
analysis of the results of the assignment of legal rights. These
two approaches are markedly different methods for determining
equity. A consideration of each method is necessary for an un-
derstanding of equity in the foreclosure process.
The rejection of strict foreclosure by a great majority of ju-
risdictions and the existence of extensive mortgagor protection
indicates that society prefers the assignment of some legal rights
to mortgagors in mortgage foreclosures. All but six states have
rejected strict foreclosure as the primary method of foreclo-
sure.246 Commentators have assailed strict foreclosure as unduly
harsh on mortgagors.247 Furthermore, many states offer rein-
statement,248 only some states allow power of sale foreclosure,249
some states require judicial confirmation of foreclosure sales,2'"
some states ban or limit deficiency judgments,251 and most states
allow post-sale redemption.2 2 Taken as a whole, these states'
provisions support the proposition that society has made an eq-
uitable determination that strict foreclosure is not desirable and
that defaulting mortgagors should be "protected."
The changes made to the ULTA from 1975 to 1977 are an-
other indicator of the contemporary rejection of strict foreclo-
sure. The drafters omitted strict foreclosure from the 1977 ver-
245. Harris and Jorde, Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines: Implications of
Antitrust Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 464, 466 (1983).
246. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
249. See generally supra note 111 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 147-58 and accompanying text.
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sion of the ULTA.253 This omission indicates that the organized
bar and the commissioners considered strict foreclosure -undesir-
able or politically unacceptable. 2 4 The ULTA also provides ex-
tensive mortgagor protection, including reinstatement 255 and
court confirmation of court-ordered foreclosure sales.256 Further,
protected parties have greater rights of reinstatement and im-
munity from deficiency judgments and foreclosure of purchase
money mortgages.
25
7
On the other hand, one may explain the rejection of strict
foreclosure and the establishment of mortgagor protection as
benefiting the legal community, and interests represented by at-
torneys, rather than benefiting society. No clearly accurate
method exists to determine the mortgage foreclosure method
that society prefers. 258 The organized bar's resistance to the pro-
visions for strict foreclosure in the ULTA and the lack of enthu-
siasm for the ULTA in general259 indicate at least some senti-
ment in the general population that the current state of the law
is equitable.
Determining society's subjective desires does not indicate
what society should objectively prefer. If society compared the
current winners and losers in foreclosure by sale and the costs
associated with mortgage loans, perhaps a different preference
would result. Objectively, defaulting mortgagors are the benefi-
ciaries of foreclosure by sale because the current system is
designed to protect their individual economic interests by giving
them greater opportunities to avoid or negate foreclosure. On
the other hand, mortgagees, mortgagees' savings depositors and
shareholders, and mortgagors who do not default on mortgage
loans are clearly potential losers of foreclosure by sale. In one
sense, a mortgagor benefits from any mortgage foreclosure pro-
cess because he does not lose the mortgaged property automati-
cally upon default. Lenders, their shareholders, and two catego-
ries of a lender's customers bear the expense of the process. It is
253. COMMISSIONERS' HANDBOOK 1977, supra note 160, at 160.
254. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 164-65, 168, 220 and accompanying text.
258. Of course, it is difficult to ascertain public opinion, even after conducting a
widespread public opinion survey.
259. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
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arguable that, because any mortgagor may default, all mortga-
gors benefit potentially from foreclosure laws that protect mort-
gagors. This assertion misses the point, however, because unless
a mortgagor defaults he is not benefitted. Any equitable consid-
eration of benefits should focus on actual and not potential ben-
efits. Defaulting mortgagors are the only parties who actually
benefit from mortgagor protection.
The various interests involved in a foreclosure setting can-
not be allocated with any degree of certainty between an indi-
vidual mortgagor and the groups that suffer from that mortga-
gor's right to a costly foreclosure. It is possible, however, to
identify areas in which the interests of certain broad groups af-
fected by the foreclosure process should prevail over the inter-
ests of an individual.
2. Fairness
A fair foreclosure process is one that is in fact fair as well as
perceived as fair by those affected or potentially affected by it.
Society will reject a system that is fair in fact if it is not per-
ceived to be fair. Fairness and equity overlap to some degree.
Fairness is highly subjective, and the perception of fairness is
particularly subjective. Whether society deems a particular act
fair or not usually depends on society's relative assignment of
legal rights prior to the act. Equitable choices frequently are
based on a perception of procedural fairness. Equity and fair-
ness must therefore be considered together.
Procedural fairness in mortgage foreclosures requires that a
mortgagor have an opportunity to assert that foreclosure is inap-
propriate. Procedural fairness also requires that a mortgagor be
provided with the means to protect his economic interests as a
matter of right. These two somewhat divergent considerations
are inherent in the process of judicial foreclosure. A court must
determine the appropriateness of a particular foreclosure before
sale is ordered, and a mortgagor may redeem a mortgage and sell
the property before the sale or he may bid at the sale. By com-
parison, judicial strict foreclosure provides the mortgagor only
with an opportunity to attack the appropriateness of the foreclo-
sure, and power of sale foreclosure provides the mortgagor only
with an opportunity to protect his economic interest.
An opportunity to raise objections in a meaningful manner
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is an important part of procedural fairness. The ability to pro-
tect one's economic interest, however, is inherent in free bar-
gaining and the unrestricted ability to enter into economic
transactions. Although objective considerations underlie proce-
dural fairness, once society makes equitable determinations, the
perception of fairness is purely subjective. Society may not per-
ceive as procedurally fair a system, such as absolute nonjudicial
strict foreclosure, that comports purely with economic efficiency
because society views lenders, especially lending institutions, as
being more powerful than borrowers. Society views a procedural
rule as unfair if it gives a stronger economic actor a summary
right to terminate the economic interest of its partner. Further,
current mortgage foreclosure law contains extensive protection
for mortgagors, including reinstatement, statutory redemption,
and limits on deficiency judgments. Some of these protections
specifically benefit homeowners.2 60 Society will likely perceive a
provision for absolute, nonjudicial strict foreclosure of home
mortgages as unfair.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR STRICT FORECLOSURE
This section synthesizes the conclusions of the prior sec-
tions and proposes changes in the current law of mortgage fore-
closure. The proposed changes would align mortgage foreclosure
law more closely with economic efficiency and social reality.
A. Synthesis
Current mortgage law is inefficient. As stated, three large
economic groups bear the cost of mortgage foreclosure while the
benefits of the process are confined to the small group of mort-
gagors who default. The initial cost of mortgage foreclosures is
easily identified because the passage of time is the most signifi-
cant aspect. Foreclosure transaction costs are identifiable,26 1 and
the assignment of legal rights in the mortgage foreclosure pro-
cess substantially affects those costs. 262 If economic efficiency is
260. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2329.08 (Baldwin 1975); OR. REV. STAT. § 88.070 (1981). These statutes provide limita-
tions on deficiency judgments.
261. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 239-44 and accompanying text.
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society's only goal, mortgagees should be entitled absolutely to
nonjudicial strict foreclosure. It is inefficient to permit a large
number of individuals to bear the costs of foreclosure for the
benefit of a few.
Currently, one state provides a reasonably efficient foreclo-
sure process. Maine permits strict foreclosure upon notice and
permits a mortgagor within one year to redeem the property for
the amount of the debt.263 Maine's foreclosure procedure is more
efficient than procedures of other states that permit strict fore-
closure because the procedure in Maine is private; no judicial
action is required.264 Maine's strict foreclosure procedure is not
optimally efficient, however, because it allows a mortgagor to re-
deem the property up to one year after notice of strict foreclo-
sure. The redemption period decreases efficiency by increasing
the amount of time the process requires when compared with a
process without redemption. The Maine procedure, therefore,
lowers transaction costs by permitting strict foreclosure, but
does not minimize them because it allows a mortgagor to
redeem.
The clearest example of inefficiency is judicial foreclosure as
literally every state allows it. Transaction costs of foreclosure are
increased substantially by the uncertainty inherent in judicial
proceedings. Additionally, several states prohibit or limit defi-
ciency judgments265 and thereby preclude a mortgagee in some
cases from recovering all money expended in connection with
the mortgage. Many states266 and the ULTA26" 7 create further
inefficiency by extending additional protections to homeowners
or to the owners of small parcels of property. Efficiency is not
determined by the parties' identities. Instead, efficiency is the
utilization of the best method of allocating legal rights between
parties that choose to engage in the regulated activity.
Although inefficient, current law may accurately reflect the
social policy concerns of equity. Society probably will not permit
a mortgagee to have an absolute right to strict foreclosure.
Therefore, the question is whether the efficiency achieved by
263. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6202 (Supp. 1982-83).
264. Id.
265. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
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strict foreclosure must be completely discarded in favor of eq-
uity and procedural fairness, or whether there can be a balance.
One answer favors retention of the current, inefficient sys-
tem because, on the whole, the system appears fair. However,
although current law may appear fair, it is not in fact fair. An-
other solution is the ULTA, which in its amended form attempts
to streamline nonjudicial and judicial foreclosure by sale. How-
ever, even if the ULTA is thought to include valid equitable
choices, society may perceive some of its provisions as unfair. If
commercially reasonable, the ULTA permits foreclosure sales
through private negotiations. 268 The ULTA also permits mortga-
gees to buy at their own foreclosure sales and to privately nego-
tiate the purchase of the mortgaged property when the sale is
conducted by a fiduciary or other third party.269 Because the
practice of allowing a mortgagee to purchase at a foreclosure sale
is also found outside the ULTA, 7 0 it is questionable whether the
current system appears procedurally fair. The ULTA method
may not provide a solution to mortgage law inefficiency because
it merely attempts to make current law uniform and does not
deal with the fundamental question of efficiency.
B. Basic Proposal
Judicial strict foreclosure is the best available method of
foreclosure, and should be adopted by all states. Efficiency con-
siderations should outweigh almost all objections to strict fore-
closure. By minimizing transaction costs and clarifying the legal
positions from which a mortgagor and a mortgagee bargain,
271
strict foreclosure is the most efficient method of handling de-
fault by the mortgagor. Further, strict foreclosure is equitable.
Defaulting mortgagors should, as in strict foreclosure, bear the
costs of default and should not, as in foreclosure by sale, shift
268. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3-508, 13 U.L.A. 702-03 (West Master ed.
1980).
269. Id.
270. See generally NELSON & WHrrMm, supra note 6, § 7.21 at 486.
271. If the property is worth less than the balance on the mortgage loan, no bargain-
ing will occur because the mortgagor will allow strict foreclosure. If the property is worth
more than the mortgage debt, the mortgagee may choose to pay that difference to the
mortgagor and acquire the property directly, or the mortgagor may sell the property to a
third party and pay off the mortgage loan.
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the costs of default to others. As a broad proposition, efficiency
dictates that society should not be willing to allocate its re-
sources to cause many to incur substantial cost for the benefit of
a few.
272
Nonjudicial strict foreclosure, although efficient, would
likely be criticized as unfair. Society would probably find the
specter of a mortgagee seizing his mortgagor's property without
giving the mortgagor an opportunity to raise objections to be un-
fair in fact. Further, society would almost certainly perceive
nonjudicial strict foreclosure as unfair. Strict foreclosure should
include judicial involvement because society would surely be
willing to equitably allocate the resulting transaction costs in or-
der to provide this element of fairness.
The judicial strict foreclosure process should be as expedi-
tious as possible in order to minimize costs. An inexpensive way
to make the process fair in fact, as well as in appearance, is to
include in the mortgage agreement a provision stating that, upon
a mortgagor's default, the mortgagee may obtain strict foreclo-
sure by bringing a judicial action. The ULTA's strict foreclosure
provisions required such a statement. 7 3 In addition, the ULTA's
requirement that the mortgagor be given fifteen days from re-
ceipt of notice of default to bring his loan current 274 should be
generally available. Admittedly, this grace period produces some
delay and cost. The proposal is probably fair, however, and it
would provide a socially acceptable, equitable allocation of costs.
Beyond notice and a brief reinstatement period, however, there
should be no protection for a mortgagor275 other than those im-
plicit in the ability to defend against an action for foreclosure.2 76
Finally, in a suit for strict foreclosure, the process should
permit a mortgagee to include a cause of action for a deficiency.
If the mortgagee is denied recovery for a deficiency, others will
272. Of course, society may be willing to allocate resources equitably to benefit small
groups.
273. See CoMmissIoN Rs' HANDBOOK 1975, supra note 159, at 275-76 (citing former §
3-505(c) of the Uniform Land Transactions Act).
274. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3-512(b), 13 U.L.A. 710 (West Master ed.
1980).
275. Other protections commonly include statutory redemption and limits on
deficiencies.
276. For example, a mortgagor could prove that there has not been a default, or he
could redeem by paying the balance on the mortgage loan.
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bear the resulting cost.277 Shifting the burden is inefficient and
inequitable. With respect to determining the amount of a defi-
ciency, the process should require an appraisal of the market
value of the mortgaged property, by a neutral party appointed
by the court and paid by the mortgagee. s If the appraisal indi-
cates that the value of the property is less than the balance on
the mortgage loan, the court should order strict foreclosure and
issue a judgment for the deficiency. The mortgagor should then
have no further rights in the mortgaged property.
C. Residential Mortgagors
Understandably, a difference in the perception of the fair-
ness of a process may result when that same process is applied
to different groups. For example, applying strict foreclosure to
residential and business mortgagors may create differing percep-
tions of fairness. Two aspects of this Article's proposal for judi-
cial strict foreclosure will probably raise concerns about fairness:
the ability of the mortgagee to have strict foreclosure when the
property is worth more than the balance on the mortgage loan
and the ability of the mortgagee to have both strict foreclosure
and a deficiency judgment.
If the foreclosure process protects certain groups, the initial
problem is the selection of group members. The ULTA's pro-
tected party provisions279 provide generally sufficient distinc-
tions between residential mortgagors and business mortgagors.
However, the ULTA provisions should be narrowed so that one
who assumes the mortgage of a protected party becomes a pro-
tected party himself only if he in fact either occupies the prop-
erty or one of his relatives occupies the property.280 In this man-
ner, only those who live in their homes, or who own homes in
which their relatives live, will be protected.
277. The mortgagor is no longer concerned if a deficiency is not allowed because he
is not personally liable for the mortgage loan, and he has no economic interest in the
property because, when a deficiency is sought, the property by definition is worth less
than the balance on the mortgage loan.
278. If the mortgagee bears the cost of an appraisal, he will require an appraisal
only when he believes the property is worth less than the balance of the mortgage loan.
279. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
280. This essentially is what § 1-203(a) of the Uniform Land Transaction Act re-
quires for the initial borrower to be considered a protected party.
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Permitting strict foreclosure when the mortgaged property
is worth more than the balance of the mortgage loan appears to
permit a forfeiture.281 In fact, this proposal for strict foreclosure
is not a forfeiture, because a mortgagor may sell the property to
a third party and extinguish his debt. If he chooses not to exer-
cise that option, the mortgagor can hardly claim that strict fore-
closure works a forfeiture.282
Nonetheless, strict foreclosure of property that has a value
greater than the value of the mortgage loan appears unfair. A
protected party mortgagor should therefore be permitted to de-
fend against a strict foreclosure action by demanding that the
court order an appraisal of the property at his expense.28 3 If the
appraisal shows that the property's value is equal to or less than
the balance of the mortgage loan, the court should render a
judgment for strict foreclosure and a monetary judgment for any
difference between the mortgage loan balance and the appraised
value of the property. If, on the other hand, the appraisal shows
that the property is worth more than the balance on the mort-
gage loan, the court should dismiss the action for strict foreclo-
sure and allow an action for foreclosure by sale. To foster the
perception of fairness, the "value of the property" should be the
market value and the foreclosure sale should be judicial. The
sale should be quickly and publicly executed, and the buyer
should be the highest bidder. This method minimizes delay. Fi-
nally, if the property is sold for less than the balance on the
mortgage loan, the mortgagee should be entitled to a deficiency
judgment.284
The mortgagee should always be permitted to seek a defi-
ciency judgment. Although it may be perceived as unfair to al-
low the mortgagee to obtain a deficiency judgment in addition to
strict foreclosure, it is in fact fair to make the mortgagor pay his
281. The mortgagor "forfeits" the difference between the value of the property and
the balance on the mortgage loan, that is, his equity in the property.
282. Arguably, the mortgagor might not be able to find a buyer in the time it takes
for judicial strict foreclosure. However, if the property cannot be sold for more than the
balance on the mortgage loan, the market value of the property is less than the balance
on the mortgage loan.
283. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
284. Any perceived unfairness to a mortgagor in this system is illusory. By the time
of foreclosure, a mortgagor has chosen to forgo a sale to a third party at market value.
Because a mortgagor has an opportunity to effect such a sale, he should not be able to
delay the foreclosure process further.
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debt. Unless the mortgagor causes a sale to be held, he will only
be liable for the difference between market value and the bal-
ance on the mortgage loan.285 When a mortgagor has enjoyed the
benefit of the money borrowed from a mortgagee, he should be
required to repay it.
25 6
V. CONCLUSION
The rights of strict foreclosure proposed by this Article dif-
fer substantially from this country's accepted theory of foreclo-
sure by sale. These proposals represent a simplification of ex-
isting foreclosure procedures. Efficiency should be society's
primary consideration. The current law of mortgage foreclosure
is flawed because it focuses almost entirely on equity and fair-
ness. Certain societal needs are met by current law, but mort-
gage foreclosures are primarily economic transactions and cur-
rent law results in inefficient behavior which is detrimental to
the interests of all parties to mortgage transactions. It is time to
make foreclosures more efficient.
285. See supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
286. This statement may not apply when a mortgagee also sold the property to the
mortgagor or was otherwise affiliated with the seller of the mortgaged property. For the
purposes of this Article, it is assumed that the mortgagor, and not the mortgagee, con-
trolled the initial market value of the property at the time of acquisition.
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